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by Stephen Machin and Sandra McNally
I
n 1999 the Moser report identified one in five adults in the
UK as being functionally illiterate. How do we ensure 
that the next generation of adults does not suffer the
same fate? 
The National Literacy Strategy, introduced in September
1998, is a major initiative aimed at tackling these problems
at primary school. It involves a daily “literacy hour”, with a
practical structure for time and class management and
teaching objectives for each term. But does it work? The
government has been criticised for failing to meet its own
targets for tests at the end of Key Stage 2 (i.e. the 7 to 11
phase of education). Although economists have had much
to say about the effect of increasing resources on pupil
attainment, they have generally not considered the effect 
of changing the content and structure of how a subject 
is taught. 
We present evidence that the literacy hour works. It comes
from the National Literacy Project (NLP), which was an
immediate forerunner of the National Literacy Strategy. This
introduced the literacy hour into a sub-set of schools within
a number of Local Education Authorities. We show that the
policy not only led to a substantial improvement in attain-
ment, but did so at a low cost. It also had a marked impact
on the well-known “gender gap” (favouring girls) as it had a
larger differential impact on boys.
The NLP was aimed in particular at improving the low levels
of reading and writing skills in many badly performing inner
city schools. An OFSTED report at the time was critical of
the teaching practices in such schools, which included
problems like free reading with little or no intervention by the
teacher and too much time hearing individual pupils read. In
the same way as the National Literacy Strategy, the NLP
changed the content and structure of how literacy was
taught. This new approach was based on educational
research and on international experience of similar
schemes, especially in the US. Since the NLP was intro-
duced in only a sub-set of schools two years prior to the
National Literacy Strategy (which affected all schools), we
have an opportunity to evaluate the effects of the literacy
hour by comparing the educational attainment of children in
NLP schools with that in similar schools where the NLP was
not introduced. 
The National Literacy Project was introduced in some 400
junior schools during the school years 1996/97 and
Large benefits,
low cost
Is the government’s National Literacy Strategy effective? 
Stephen Machin and Sandra McNally look at the evidence 
from the pilot project. 
The data
The empirical analysis is based on
administrative records of pupil-level
attainment and on school-level data.
For pupils, the data consists of
detailed information on educational
attainment from when they were of
age 11 and age 16. At age 11, all
pupils in England are tested at the
end of “Key Stage 2”. At age 16,
exams at the end of “Key Stage 4”
(i.e. GCSE or GNVQ) mark the end
of a pupil’s compulsory education.
The first available year of national Key
Stage 2 data for pupils is 1996, the
school year before the National
Literacy Project was introduced (we
refer to school years according to
when pupils took the exam – so
“1996” refers to the 1995/96 school
year). The NLP was introduced for
two cohorts, in 1997 and 1998.
Pupils within the first cohort finished
their compulsory education in 2002.
Hence, to evaluate the impact of the
NLP on attainment at secondary
school, we matched pupil records
from 1996 (i.e. pre-NLP) and 1997
with GCSE/GNVQ attainment data in
2001 and 2002 respectively. (At the
time of writing, we do not have data
on 2003 GCSE results and, there-
fore, cannot perform the secondary
school analysis for the second cohort
of children affected by the NLP.) 
The pupil-level files have detailed
information on attainment, gender and
codes for the schools attended,
which allows us to match national
school-level data from the School
Performance Tables and files from the
LEA and School Information Service
(LEASIS). We concentrate on two
outcome measures at the end of
primary school: the percentile reading
score and the percentage of students
attaining Level 4 or above in Key
Stage 2 English. The second measure
is a key policy indicator and is the
standard deemed to be appropriate 
at age 11. 
The NLP was introduced in some 400
schools, of which 80% were in inner
cities – several LEAs in London and
also in Sandwell, Liverpool,
Manchester, Sheffield, Newcastle and
Bristol. NLP schools represented in
total about 40% of all primary schools
within these LEAs. The remaining
NLP schools were run by three
county councils (Hampshire, Essex
and Norfolk), where they represented
only about 7 % of all primary schools. 
In order to establish a control group
against which to measure the
performance of NLP schools, we
identified geographically adjacent
LEAs not involved in the NLP. (If there
was more than one, we chose that
with the closest pre-policy perform-
ance profile.) Where we could find no
close control comparison for an NLP
authority, it was dropped from our
sample. This affected the county
councils and Bristol, where the city is
completely surrounded by semi-rural
areas. However, our sample
comprises 72% of all NLP schools 
in England.
As a robustness check, we have also
estimated regressions for a control
group consisting of all other
maintained schools in England.
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1997/98. (It was also launched in 112 infant schools, but
this part is not relevant here.) About 80% of NLP schools
were located in inner cities, where the most disadvantaged
in England are concentrated. Most schools entered the
project because they had weaknesses in reading. The
planned cost of the NLP was £12.5 million over five years.
The descriptive part of our overall findings is summarised in
Table 1. The upper part of the Table shows two primary
school attainment measures for three consecutive years: a)
the mean percentile reading score; and b) the percentage
reaching Level 4 or above in Key Stage English. Although
average performance levels are lower in NLP schools at
each point in time (which is taken account of in the regres-
sion approach) an interesting pattern emerges. In “before
and after” terms, there is clear evidence of improvement in
the NLP schools, compared with the control group. 
For reading, the mean score goes up 2.1 percentile points
in the NLP schools and falls by 1.1 in the control group. The
same relative pattern of improvement is seen for KS2
English, where the percentage of pupils attaining Level 4 or
above rises by more in NLP schools (by 12.2 percentage
points compared with 8.8 in the control group).
The lower part of the Table shows statistics on secondary
school performance in GCSE English five years later.
Currently, this can only be done for the 1997 cohort of NLP
There is clear evidence of improvement in NLP schools
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schools, which only had one year of exposure to the literacy
hour. Again, the changes are larger in the NLP schools, with
the figures going up by 3.4 percentage points as compared
with 1.1 percentage points in the control schools.
Our analysis, of course, needs to allow for differences in
the characteristics of schools and the data allow us to
control for a large number of factors. These include infor-
mation on outcomes (e.g. results, absences), inputs (e.g.
pupil-teacher ratios), social disadvantage (e.g. percentage
of students eligible for free school meals or with special
educational needs) and type of school (e.g. single sex,
grammar). A full account of the methodology will be found
in our forthcoming CEE Discussion Paper. 
Taken as a whole, the results of our regression analysis
strongly corroborate the view that the literacy hour under
the NLP significantly raised pupil performance in the
primary schools that were exposed it. Furthermore, for the
first cohort of children exposed to the literacy hour, there is
a positive and statistically significant effect of the policy on
GCSE results in English at age 16. 
We were also interested to see whether the literacy hour
had a differential impact on boys and girls. Boys have tradi-
tionally performed worse than girls in literacy-related activi-
ties. For example, in 1996 (the year before the NLP was
introduced) only 49% of boys achieved Level 4 or above in
KS2 English, compared with 64% of girls (see Table 2). If
it is correct that boys have a greater problem than girls with
concentration and focus, it might be expected that the NLP
would benefit them more.
We do indeed find such a gender difference in the NLP’s
impact at primary school. For reading, the literacy hour
raised boys’ mean percentile scores by somewhere
between 2.5 and 3.4 percentile points. The probability of
achieving Level 4 or above in KS2 English was up by
between 2.7 and 4.2% for boys. Effects for girls were
considerably smaller and not always statistically significant.
Hence the NLP had a large impact on the oft-cited gender
gap in literacy. 
It is interesting to put this finding for the 1997 cohort
against the national figures for attainment in English given in
Table 2. It is evident that the gender gap in primary school
reading and English has reduced in recent years. Our
findings are entirely consistent with the literacy hour having
continued to play an important role since the National
Literacy Strategy was introduced.
The question remains as to whether the policy was cost
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
NLP Schools Control LEA schools
A. Primary school attainment
1996 1997 1998 change 1996 1997 1998 change
1996-98 1996-98
Percentile reading score 44.4 45.3 46.5 2.1 53.9 53.2 52.8 -1.1
(.8) (.5)
% reaching Level 4 or 
above in KS2 English 37.3 47.6 49.5 12.2 50.5 57.8 59.3 8.8
(.9) (.6)
No. of pupils 12645 12586 12814 22461 21976 22172
No. of schools 283 284 283 553 551 547
B. Secondary school attainment
2001 2002 change 2001 2002 change 
2001-02 2001-02
Percentage with 
GCSE Grade 
A*-C in English 38.7 42.1 3.4 47.3 48.4 1.1
(1.1) (.6)
No. of pupils 5142 5167 18956 19553
No. of schools 147 145 549 551
Notes: Panel A covers cohorts 1 and 2 of NLP, while Panel B only considers cohort 
1 (due to lack of GCSE data for 2003). Standard errors in parentheses.
The data allow us to control for differences in schools
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effective. We try to answer this by comparing the per pupil
costs of the policy with the economic benefits, as reflected
in predicted labour market earnings.
The main costs of the NLP were 14 local centres (each
about £25,000 a year) and literacy consultants in each
participating Local Education Authority (about £27,000 a
year for each consultant). Schools also received some
funding for teacher training and resources, which was
broadly the same for each school (though some account
was taken of the pupil-teacher ratio). However, since the
National Literacy Strategy was introduced two years after
the NLP, only the first two years of the original £12.5 million
five-year programme are relevant. The total cost per annum
was thus £2.5 million (or about £2.8 million in 2001 prices).
The cost per pupil involved was just over £25 a year. 
It might be argued that the literacy hour takes teaching
effort and resources away from other subjects and that this
indirect cost effect (via substitution) should be taken
account of in a cost-benefit calculation. However, literacy
was being taught in some form before the policy for the
same kind of time. Therefore, the literacy hour represents a
change in how reading and writing are taught, rather than
an increase in the time devoted to the subject. There are
also likely to be positive spillovers between pupil subject
areas and associated teacher practice. 
First, since the ability to read and write are important
generic skills, an improvement in how these skills are taught
might lead to improved performance in other subjects.
Secondly, the literacy hour is likely to have caused teachers
to re-evaluate their teaching methods in other subjects. This
is important in English primary schools because, generally,
pupils within a particular year group are taught every
subject by the same teacher. We do indeed find some
evidence linking the literacy hour to higher levels of achieve-
ment in Mathematics. Thus, if anything, the effects of the
NLP are likely to be underestimated in our approach.
To estimate benefits of the policy we investigated the impact
of reading scores on future labour market earnings, using
the British Cohort Study. This is a panel survey of all those
living in Great Britain born between 5 and 11 April 1970.
We regressed the log of labour market earnings (at age 30,
in 2000) on age 10 percentile reading scores (from 1980).
We then include controls for various factors, like gender,
region, family background and highest educational qualifi-
cation achieved by age 30. Since the educational qualifica-
tion variable is likely to partly capture the effect of the
reading score, the effect of reading on labour market
earnings is likely to be an underestimate when this variable
is included. 
These estimates are inevitably somewhat broad brush. But,
Table 2. Primary and secondary school English attainment 1966-2002
A. Primary school attainment
% Pupils achieving Level 4 and above in Key Stage 2 English
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Change % points
% % % % % % % 1996-2002
All 57 63 65 71 75 75 75 18
Boys 50 57 57 65 70 70 70 20
Girls 65 70 73 76 79 80 79 14
% Pupils achieving Level 4 and above in Key Stage 2 Reading
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Change % points
1997-2002
All n/a 67 71 78 83 82 80 13
Boys n/a 63 64 75 80 78 77 14
Girls n/a 71 79 82 86 85 83 12
B. Secondary school attainment
% Pupils achieving Grade C or above GCSE English
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Change % points
1996-2002
All 49 52 51 53 54 59 56 7
Boys 40 43 42 45 46 51 48 8
Girls 58 61 59 61 62 66 64 6
Note: Data from DfES national statistics.
Scores for boys improved more than for girls
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assuming that the pupil goes on to work from age 20 to 65
and using a discount rate of 3%, we estimate under a
number of realistic assumptions the present discounted
value of the cumulative effect of the literacy hour to be
somewhere between £2,000 and £5,500.
Whichever way one looks at it, the benefits of the literacy
hour seem to be large and the costs small. These findings
are of considerable significance to the wider debate about
what works best and most cost effectively for improving
pupil performance. 
Stephen Machin is Director of Research at the CEP, Director of
the DfES Centre for the Economics of Education and Professor of
Economics at University College London.
Sandra McNally is a member of the Centre for the Economics of
Education at the CEP.
This article is based on research that will be published in a
forthcoming CEE Discussion Paper.
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by Hilary Steedman, Karin Wagner and Jim Foreman
C
redit is usually given to “Leo”, the business
computer device constructed by J. Lyons &
Co, the catering and food company, in the
early 1950s, for being the first practical
application of information and communica-
tion technology (ICT) in Britain. But the
new communication and faster information
retrieval and manipulation possibilities for business did not
really open up until the early 1990s, with the advent of in-
house networking and faster and more powerful electronic
communication, including direct communication between
data capture and data manipulation devices.
The extent to which the potential of these technologies was
exploited for the automation of business and manufacturing
processes in advanced industrialised countries was
undoubtedly driven by the heightened competitive environ-
ment of the last quarter of the 20th century. Entirely new
types of economic activity, for example software develop-
ment and, more recently, web page design and web server
support, assumed much greater relative weight. More
established sectors of economic activity – for example,
retailing, financial services and manufacturing – increased
investment in ICT and consequently expanded ICT-related
employment. The OECD estimates that employment in
computer and related activities in the UK was 115% higher
in 1999 than ten years earlier.
Using an occupational measure developed for the Council
of European Professional Informatics Societies (CEPIS) in
2002, Britain now has some 850,000 ICT practitioners,
considerably more than the 550,000 in Germany. In
Germany, ICT practitioners are 1.45% of total employment
and 2.1% of service employment. In Britain the correspon-
ding figures are 2.33% and 3.1% respectively.
The research report on which this article is based analysed
the contrasting British and German national strategies for
Meeting the ICT
challenge
Like the UK, Germany is facing educational challenges over
information technology. Hilary Steedman, Karin Wagner and 
Jim Foreman look at the two countries’ contrasting responses.
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the supply of ICT skills and examined their impact on the
companies engaged in the industry. Some 90 firms in
Britain and Germany were interviewed, selected at random
from four sectors – financial services, retailing, motor
manufacture and software development. 
The requirements of the ICT industries in each country
seem to be similar, but the British and the German higher
education (HE) systems are organised in diverse ways and,
therefore, the supply by the educational system differs
considerably. For example, in 2001 the output of computer
science graduates from German universities and applied
universities (Fachhochschulen) was in the region of 6,000.
In Britain that year some 20,000 computer science gradu-
ates left university with two-year diplomas, first degrees or
postgraduate qualifications.
The low annual output of ICT graduates in Germany reflects
the long lead times and high drop out rates typical of the
German higher education system. Numbers in the system
have now expanded, but the increase in supply will not
come through for some years. In Britain, by contrast,
shorter courses and low drop out rates have helped the
steady increase in the supply of ICT graduates.
These low numbers of computer science graduates have
had an important impact on the skill supply strategies of
German companies. They pay higher starting salaries to
graduates than their British counterparts, yet still have
concerns about supply. The pool of ICT contractors avail-
able to German companies is smaller than in Britain, proba-
bly reflecting the relative scarcity of qualified graduates.
The German language is, of course, a barrier to the employ-
ment of non-German speakers in ICT occupations, even
though English is the working language of ICT. Employees
still need to communicate with colleagues and customers
and to fit into the working environment. As a result, German
companies consider that they are losing out to competitors
in Anglo-Saxon countries, who can attract good ICT
practioners from abroad. 
An important advantage of the British system is the flexibil-
ity to move from a first degree to a postgraduate course. At
this point it is possible to change subjects. It is also open to
those with a first degree and some years of work experi-
ence to return to university for one- or two-year courses
leading to a Masters degree or other postgraduate qualifi-
cation.
This flexibility is not available in Germany, where courses at
the traditional and applied universities (FHS) are parallel
and take at least four years. Changeover between subjects
is cumbersome and rarely occurs. The newly designed
German Bachelor and Master courses will eventually make
changing subjects easier and lead to a higher graduate
output. But their impact so far has been negligible.
A clear advantage of the German system, however, is the
requirement for internships as part of the FHS courses. It
leads to early contact of students with companies and
provides relevant experience of the world of work, which
helps the subsequent recruitment process greatly. This also
reduces the training costs for the company.
Within higher education, in Germany the traditional appren-
ticeship system has long held a position of higher esteem
than in Britain. However, there has been recent questioning
of its continuing relevance to ICT companies, working as
they are with intense global competitive pressures and a
high premium on flexibility and adaptability. The argument is
whether the traditional concepts underlying an apprentice-
ship linked to a particular trade or profession (Beruf),
defined in terms of the individual’s status in relation to other
employees and his or her “ownership” of defined areas of
skill and action, were compatible with the less hierarchical
cooperation across traditional boundaries required in the
new industries. Thus, when the decision was taken in 1997
to establish four new apprenticeship occupations in the ICT
field, this was widely perceived as a test of the “innovative
potential” of the German “dual” system. 
Britain now has some 850,000 ICT practitioners
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The new qualifications were developed in about a year, in
contrast to the accepted wisdom that the development of
apprentice qualifications was an inevitably lengthy and
cumbersome procedure. Four occupations were identified
and the programmes sought to ensure that apprentices
acquire relevant and cutting-edge skills and competences.
The training programme is composed of core competences
and optional elements, which allow for specialised training
relevant to the apprentice’s training firm. 
German employers were clear from the outset that one aim
of promoting apprenticeships was to produce the skills that
companies required at a lower cost. The apprenticeship
system was intended to replace more expensive graduates
from the higher education system.
While in training, German apprentices are paid about one
third of the full rate for the occupation involved. Our data on
salary levels confirmed that qualified apprentices in ITC
companies are earning about two thirds of the pay of gradu-
ates. Many of the German companies we interviewed with
apprentices in training expected that they would undertake
tasks similar to those carried out by graduate recruits.
Some hoped to develop a core of personnel that did not aim
for fast promotion and would provide stability at the base of
the firm. They seemed confident that, provided apprentices
continued training and study, they would play a significant
part in combating future skill shortages.
In this respect there is a huge contrast between employers’
enthusiasm for apprenticeship is Germany and the almost
total disdain shown by ICT employers for the Modern
Apprenticeship scheme in Britain. In 2001, fewer than
1,000 young people started a technical ICT apprenticeship
in Britain, compared with some 20,000 in Germany. This is
despite the fact that the ICT Modern Apprenticeship was
established in Britain in 1995, two years before the four
German ICT apprenticeships began.
German apprentices are intended to replace more expensive graduates
German companies mistrusted ICT conversion courses
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British companies undoubtedly suffer from “information
failure” in relation to apprenticeships. Hardly any of those
we spoke to had heard of the Modern Apprenticeship
scheme and we, therefore, could not explore with them their
reasons for not making use of it. By contrast, the German
managers we spoke to were familiar with the new German
ICT apprenticeship schemes, no doubt because of exten-
sive campaigns about them by the German government and
their Chambers of Commerce. 
One important difference between the two countries is that
far fewer Germans aspire to go to university and, 
therefore, the available pool of able candidates for appren-
ticeships is greater. In Germany, two thirds of young
people expect to enter apprenticeships, though around
20% of these will in fact go to universities or FHS. In
Britain, 50% of the same age cohort is now aiming for
university via the A level route. The potential apprenticeship
pool in Britain is further reduced by companies that recruit
young people with A level qualifications directly to their
own training schemes. There is also anecdotal evidence
that British companies that have taken on ICT apprentices
have found the assessment and certification procedures to
be burdensome and costly.
The explanation does not seem to lie in differing standards.
Our evidence is that a good Modern Apprentice in Britain,
capable of attaining NVQ Level 3, could cope with most of
the demands of the equivalent German apprenticeship. 
British ITC companies’ neglect of apprenticeships cannot
be explained by arguing that they do not need or use inter-
mediate skills. Only some two thirds of those employed in
ICT in Britain are educated to degree level. Many of the
companies we visited in Britain, in particular those in the
“user” sectors, recruited young people with A level qualifi-
cations and then devoted a considerable proportion of their
own resources to training them in ICT occupations. 
Far fewer Germans aspire to go to university
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British and German ICT companies have responded differ-
ently to the recruitment market facing them. We found
British companies paid little attention to the degree qualifi-
cations of those they recruited, provided that they had suffi-
cient previous experience. We were told that “the last three
jobs” were all that really counted when it came to the
recruitment decision. Graduates taken on as their first job
could have a wide range of first degree, not just in ICT or
cognate disciplines. 
This approach obviously widened the pool of potential
recruits, but led at the same time to problems in narrowing
down applications and identifying good applicants. British
companies used recruitment agencies to help them here
and incurred significant costs as a result. However, this
approach probably means that they are less affected by
skills shortages than their German counterparts.
German companies were less flexible in their recruitment
policies. They mostly mistrusted applicants that has been
through ICT “conversion courses”, even when they had a
first degree. As in Britain, companies went for a mixture of
graduate and non-graduate recruits. But their graduates
came almost exclusively from ICT or closely cognate disci-
plines. This inevitably restricted the pool of potential
recruits. German companies spend longer themselves
identifying requisite skills in candidates and rarely used
employment agencies.
We had the strong impression that German companies
expected university and FHS graduates to become fully
effective at a relative high level within a short time. Certainly,
German companies supplied less off-the-job training to new
graduate recruits than did the British. Most learning was on-
the-job through projects, backed by short seminars. It was
rare for German companies to invest in graduate recruit-
ment programmes of the sort found in Britain to recruit
potential top managers. Having come through the German
university education system, however, German graduate
recruits were likely to be considerably older at 28 or more. 
German companies’ views on how university education
could be improved from their point of view were more
consistent than the views of British companies. Almost
unanimously they thought that university students did not
have enough experience of the real world, particular of the
realities of the business environment. FHS students were
recognised as having followed more practical courses, but
graduates from the traditional universities, in particular those
with PhDs, were described as suffering from “work shock”. 
Some British companies were “very satisfied” with the
graduates they were recruiting. Arts graduates were appre-
ciated for having better communication and “soft” skills.
Lack of communication skills was often identified as a
weakness in ICT graduates. Around half the comments
recorded echoed the German complaints about lack of
awareness of the business environment.
Hilary Steedman is a Senior Research Fellow at the CEP.
Karin Wagner is a Professor at the Fachhochschule für Technik
und Wirtschaft, Berlin.
Jim Foreman is a member of the CEP.
This article is based on their study for the Anglo-German
Foundation “ICT skills in the UK and Germany: how companies
adapt and react”, published in September 2003, which can be
downloaded at http://www.agf.org.uk/pubs/publications.shtml 
A fuller account of the research is contained in the CEP’s
Discussion Paper No. 575, which can also be downloaded at
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/dp.asp?prog=CEPDP&pubyear=2003 .
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by David Marsden
T
here is a paradox to be explained concerning the
spread of performance-related pay (PRP) in the
British public services. It has been common to
associate the introduction of PRP with the aim of
improving incentives and motivation among public
employees. Starting in the late 1980s, the British public
services embarked on the most systematic and sustained
policy of extending and developing performance-related pay
of any OECD country, mostly replacing annual seniority-
related pay increments with performance-related ones
based on goal setting and appraisals by line managers. 
Nevertheless, after surveying both academic research
findings and inside management information, the govern-
ment’s Makinson report concluded in 2002 that perform-
ance pay had not motivated public employees in Britain and
that its operation had been divisive. Given that the policy
has been sustained by three successive prime ministers of
quite different political persuasion – Margaret Thatcher,
John Major and Tony Blair – as well as successive top
public service managers, its continued use cannot plausibly
be explained by political dogma. Likewise, in the face of
such evidence, the perseverance of top public management
and of successive governments with PRP is hard to under-
stand, if employee motivation is the main story. We need to
look elsewhere for an explanation.
An alternative explanation can be found in the use of
performance pay (and of performance management more
widely) to provide a framework for renegotiating perform-
ance standards with employees. This is consistent both
with rising organisational performance, which would explain
top management’s perseverance, and with all the evidence
that PRP has failed to motivate many public employees.
It has been common to analyse the workings of PRP
through the lenses of three main theories: agency,
expectancy, and goal setting. These theories shed much
light on the static incentive and appraisal processes present
in PRP. They have focused mainly on how management can
influence employees’ choice between different levels of
effort or care in their work for a given set of performance
norms. To understand what has happened with PRP in the
British public services, however, one needs to complement
the perspective provided by these theories with a more
dynamic analysis of inducements for employees to agree to,
and work within, a new set of performance norms.
The idea of renegotiation is most simply explained in terms
of contract theory. A worker and a firm agree to the terms
of their exchange when the worker is hired. A key feature of
the employment contract is that it should be open-ended in
terms of both its duration and its content. Workers agree to
Value
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give management some
flexibility to adapt that
content to changing
demands, but only within
certain limits. From time to
time, these limits require
revision. Such a juncture becomes
an occasion for renegotiation. By now,
however, each party has made investments in the relation-
ship and is vulnerable to pressure tactics from the other.
Much of the contract literature emphasises pay, because of
changes in the market valuation of employee output. Less
visible, but just as important for management, is its ability to
revise job boundaries and to redefine the nature and
standards of performance that it requires from employees.
These standards, which may include qualitative aspects of
performance, are usually the subject of a tacit understand-
ing between staff and management, sometimes called the
“effort bargain”.
By what processes does renegotiation come about? Many
recent studies have focused on the role here of collective
bargaining. Their main interest, however, has been in pay
adjustments. Pay rules are generally codified by virtue of
their inclusion in collective agreements and individual
contracts of employment. In contrast, many of the rules
relating to workers’ job boundaries and performance
standards contain a large uncodified element. It is common
for jobs to deviate considerably from their formal job
descriptions. The features of a given job are therefore
accessible to higher management only through the eyes of
first-line managers. To renegotiate performance, manage-
ment needs to get right down to the level of individual jobs
and to the relationship between individual employees and
their line managers.
Collective agreements often
set the overall framework,
but ultimately this kind of
negotiation has to occur
between line managers and
individuals, or small groups of
employees in the same office or
hospital ward.
At the time of hiring, workers who do not like the supervi-
sory practices and incentive systems that the employer
offers can just walk away, so there is a process of self-
selection matching these job features to workers’ prefer-
ences. However, when the time comes for changing work
practices and incentive systems in an established organisa-
tion, the employer faces an incumbent work force whose
preferences for or against the new system may vary consid-
erably. In the change, some will expect to be winners and
others losers. To get everyone to engage positively in the
new system, management would have to offer a very attrac-
tive and costly deal. It might, therefore, prefer to make the
new deal attractive to a sufficient proportion of its staff, so
that the scheme functions tolerably well, and to forego the
support of the remaining staff in order to keep within some
budgetary limit.
So the “renegotiation” explanation leads us to expect any
net performance improvements in this study to depend on
the combined effects of the move to new work norms and
the attractiveness of the incentives provided by the new
PRP system. However, neither effect is uniform across all
employees. Some will be positively attracted to the new
deal, which comprises both new norms and new incentives.
Employee motivation is
not the main story
Revision becomes an
occasion for renegotiation
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They are likely to be motivated and to deliver higher
performance. Others may resent the new arrangements
and not find the pay scheme motivating. Nevertheless, their
lack of motivation may not necessarily translate into a
decline in their performance. Such employees must weigh
the benefits of accepting the new scheme against the costs
of finding an alternative. They may not like the new system,
but they may still choose to work within it because chang-
ing jobs is not worth their while and they do not wish to be
dismissed. 
The greater management attention to goal setting and
performance appraisal that accompanies PRP is likely to
increase the effectiveness with which the new work norms
are monitored and discourage reduced performance.
Provided performance of the discontented does not fall too
much, the organisation may still benefit from the increased
performance of those who engage positively, assuming they
do so in sufficient numbers.
In this reading, renegotiation and incentive can be comple-
mentary functions of PRP. One can say that the incentive
mechanisms and, particularly, the goal-setting mechanisms
have to be working properly for PRP to be an effective
means of changing work norms. Agency theory also
provides a picture of the static functions of PRP. It explains
how performance and output incentives encourage employ-
ees to work hard (and not to “shirk”), even when manage-
ment finds it costly to monitor their effort closely. It suggests
that management can respond by tying pay to output so as
to induce employees to choose a higher level of effort and
also, by investing in better systems of work design and
performance evaluation, to improve the correlation between
performance measures and effort, thus strengthening
incentive effects. It also warns against the dysfunctions of
inappropriate incentives, such as individual incentives that
discourage cooperation among colleagues.
Expectancy theory, like agency theory, treats employees as
having a degree of choice and places a strong emphasis on
the motivational effects of incentives and on the problems
posed by poorly defined targets. Simplifying somewhat, it
identifies a potentially virtuous circle. Employees will
respond to the incentive or reward on offer if they value it
(valence), if they believe good performance will be instru-
mental in bringing the desired reward (instrumentality) and
if they expect their efforts will achieve the desired perform-
ance (expectancy). The circle of valence-instrumentality-
expectancy can be broken at a number of points.
Employees may feel they lack scope to increase their effort,
or that their effort will make little difference to their perform-
ance. This undermines expectancy. They may believe that
management lacks the competence or the good faith to
evaluate and reward their performance fairly, a view that
undermines instrumentality. Applying these considerations
to renegotiation, one can see that employees are more likely
There will be winners and losers
It is common for jobs to deviate
from their formal description
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to buy into a new incentive scheme when they perceive it as
operating fairly and able to deliver the promised rewards.
Goal-setting theory places less emphasis on rewards and
stresses the motivating power of defining appropriate work
goals and engaging employee commitment to them. Of
special relevance in the current context is its emphasis on
dialogue between line managers and employees to
exchange information about realistic goals and on agreeing
to them, so that employees adopt them as their own. This
framework already contains the germs of a negotiation
process between employees and their managers. So it is
easy to see how the basic idea can be applied in the context
of renegotiating performance norms. Goal setting may be
especially important for the employees who do not like the
new system, but still prefer not to change jobs. In such
cases, it provides management with a channel to clarify the
new standards and establish agreed levels of compliance.
Thus, although the last three approaches – agency,
expectancy and goal setting – differ in emphasis, they point
to the same key processes and variables for the analysis of
performance pay systems: reward and motivation on the
one hand and goal definition and evaluation on the other.
My argument is that the main impact of the introduction of
PRP across large sections of the British public services
during the 1990s was to facilitate the renegotiation of
performance norms. When introducing a new incentive
scheme to an established work force, management is
almost certain to encounter a wide spread of employee
preferences and the problem of winners and losers. Thus,
even when a scheme is well designed and managers are
well prepared to operate it, there will frequently be not only
employees who respond favorably and agree to the new
norms, but also others who resent the norms and consider
themselves worse off. Whereas the former are positively
motivated to improve or adapt their performance, the latter
are not and managers hold them to the new performance
norms by means of goal setting and appraisal. In this way,
one can explain why successive governments and top
managers have believed in the merits of PRP for the public
services despite the evidence – of which they were certainly
aware – that many employees saw little incentive and much
divisiveness in them.
To some extent, renegotiation has emerged as a latent
rather than an explicitly stated goal of PRP in the public
services. When senior managers at the Inland Revenue
were asked in 1991 about the goals of the PRP scheme
they operated then, they responded in terms of motivation.
Likewise, officials of the union representing Inland Revenue
staff had encouraged their members to complete the
questionnaires because they expected the survey to
demonstrate publicly what they already knew: that the
scheme was not motivating staff. The second Inland
Revenue scheme, introduced in 1993, did not speak of
renegotiation, but used the language of agreeing to objec-
tives and establishing a “contract” with individual employ-
ees and of relating these to the department’s operating
plans. 
This is where contract theory, and some of the older indus-
trial relations literature, may prove helpful in understanding
what is going on. Unions and their workplace representa-
tives may be weaker now than in years past, but the labour
market continues to confer sometimes considerable individ-
Management can
respond by tying
pay to output
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ual bargaining power on workers. Of course, a large organ-
isation can always face down an individual worker, no
matter how skilled or talented, but it cannot afford a gradual
bleeding away of its skilled personnel. It is not possible for
a management just to impose its optimal design. It has to
negotiate its way to an approximation of that design and, in
so doing, to respect the various budgetary and efficiency
constraints it must satisfy to meet its own objectives.
In his 1999 Journal of Economic Literature review of work
on incentives, Canice Prendergast commented on the need
to extend the study of incentives beyond CEOs, sales
personnel and sports stars. Such people often have short
job tenures and their high rate of labour turnover means that
self-selection often brings about a match between
employee preferences and the type of incentive offered by
the organisation. The public service has highlighted the
opposite problem, where high labour stability, especially
during the early to mid-1990s, meant that employers had to
obtain results from new incentive schemes when imple-
menting them for a large incumbent work force. 
The public services’ experience of PRP has also highlighted
the key role of line managers. They are essential to the
renegotiation process because they are the link between
top management’s goals and the way ordinary staff carry
out their jobs. This introduces another layer in the principal-
agent analysis of incentives. Line managers’ abilities and
interests are not identical to those of top management and
they have no protective gatekeepers controlling staff
access to them. When agreeing to performance objectives
with individual staff, the pressures on them to be lenient are
great. What seems to have kept these pressures mostly at
bay has been the articulation between performance objec-
tives at different levels within the public organisations. This
has provided support to line managers and given them the
means to keep a focus on broader organisational perform-
ance when establishing individual objectives. 
David Marsden is Professor of Industrial Relations at the LSE and
a member of the CEP.
This article is based on the data from a series of attitude surveys
of employees and line managers in six areas of the public service:
the Inland Revenue, the Employment Service, two NHS trust
hospitals and head teachers in primary and secondary schools. A
fuller article, including an extended discussion of the data, will be
published in the Industrial and Labor Relations Review in April.
References & further reading
Brown, Michelle, and John S. Heywood, eds. 2002. Paying for
Performance: An International Comparison. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E.
Sharpe.
Brown, Trevor C., and Gary P. Latham. 2000. “The Effects of
Goal Setting and Self-Instruction Training on the Performance of
Unionized Employees”. Relations Industrielles, Vol. 55, No. 1
(Winter), pp. 80–95.
CentrePiece Spring 200420
by Riccardo Peccei, Helen Bewley, 
Howard Gospel and Paul Willman
D
isclosure of information by firms to their
employees has been widely accepted by
academics as good management practice,
resulting in higher employee satisfaction and
commitment and, thereby, to better organisa-
tional performance. In the past, there has
been no general requirement in this country for firms to
disclose such information, though there are broad require-
ments in specific areas, such as health and safety. But now
the European Directive on Information and Consultation has
introduced such a general requirement, which will progres-
sively come into force from early next year onwards.
We still, in fact, know little about the effects of disclosure on
the performance of firms. Such empirical work as has been
done specifically on the organisational, as opposed to
individual, outcomes of disclosure, for example in the United
States and Japan, has been somewhat contradictory. So, in
this research, we used the 1998 Workplace Employee
Relations Survey (WERS98) for the UK to test competing
explanations of the impact of information disclosure on two
measures of organisational performance: labour productiv-
ity and product/service quality. 
One argument is that it is good management practice,
bringing benefits to the firm, to keep employees informed
on a range of issues relating to their jobs and broader
organisational matters. Within the literature this idea is often
embedded in wider arguments about the impact of “high
commitment”, “high involvement”, or “high performance”
human resource (HR) practices. This is not the place for a
detailed review of that literature, but two points about it
should be noted.
The first point is that studies in this area do not, by and
large, make a clear distinction between process and
content: between the various communication mechanisms
used in organisations and the actual information disclosed
to employees. Even the few studies that focus explicitly on
the content of what is disclosed often treat it as part of a
broader bundle of HR practices, rather than look at the
impact that disclosure itself has on outcomes.
Our specific interest here is in the extent to which manage-
ment disclosure of different types of information to employ-
ees, either directly or through their representatives, affects
key aspects of organisational
performance. We focused on the
disclosure of three main types of
information to employees at the
level of the establishment: (1) the
overall financial and staffing
position of the establishment; (2)
specific production, quality and
operational targets set for the
How to
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establishment; and (3) feedback on
the achievement of these targets.
A further interest is in the theoretical
links between information disclosure
and performance outcomes. Central
to the HRM literature is the idea that
information disclosure contributes to organisational
performance by helping to align individual and organisa-
tional goals and by helping to enhance general levels of
employee identification and integration at work. The theory,
in other words, is that the development of organisational
commitment (OC) has a positive impact on organisational
performance by increasing employees’ willingness to exert
effort on the job and to behave at work in ways that benefit
the organisation.
There may be other factors than higher organisational
commitment that help to account for the positive effects of
disclosure in performance. Goal-setting theory, for example,
suggests that providing employees with systematic informa-
tion about performance targets and providing feedback on
the achievement of goals can help to heighten motivation
and focus employee effort. Similarly, certain strands of job
design theory suggest that providing employees with fuller
information about their work environment, including the
position and operation of the organisation, may help to
enhance the meaningfulness of work, thereby contributing
to employee motivation and, ultimately, to performance.
These are two “universalistic” theories of how information
disclosure to employees can have a positive effect of
performance, one working through higher organisational
commitment and the other not. Some academics, however,
have argued that the impact of information disclosure on
organisational performance is likely to be “contingent” on a
series of other factors. Thus it may be affected by levels of
organisational commitment. In addition, Kleiner and Bouillon
found that, in the US, the provision of information by firms
was positively correlated to the level of employee benefits
and wages, but not to productivity. In Japan, however,
Morishima found that information disclosure was related
negatively with labour costs but positively with profitability
and productivity.
Such contrasting results may be attributable to differences
in study methods or sampling, or to institutional arrange-
ments, or to cultural differences between the US and Japan.
However, following Kleiner and Bouillon, Morishima formu-
lates a theoretical explanation in terms of the underlying
negotiating games between employers and employees. The
first (Japanese) game involves “goal alignment”, in which
disclosure operates to bring the parties closer together on
the basis of shared understanding and information in what
one might broadly characterise as “integrative bargaining”.
The second (US) game, based on asymmetry of informa-
tion, essentially involves bargaining over residual rents and
is characterised by “distributive bargaining”.
In the Japanese case one might expect higher levels of
disclosure to have a positive impact on the negotiating
process and, perhaps, on production and financial perform-
ance. In the US case there are strong incentives for
management to limit voluntary disclosure, because employ-
ees in possession of greater information simply use it to
extract for themselves a greater share of residual rents,
resulting in higher wages but lower profitability and also,
possibly, lower productivity.
We build on these ideas and extend them to notions of
organisational commitment. We treat the extent of
workforce commitment to the organisation as a key factor
that may affect the impact of information disclosure on
performance outcomes. There are, however, different ways
in which OC may moderate the impact of disclosure on
outcomes. Here we focus on two possibilities.
The first possibility is that information disclosure has a
positive impact on organisational performance only, or
primarily, when levels of OC amongst the workforce are
already high. This is because committed employees are
more likely to use any additional information they obtain
from management for the benefit of the organisation.
Employees who are less committed are more likely either to
ignore the information or to use it for their own benefit.
When levels of commitment amongst the workforce are low,
therefore, disclosure is likely to have either a negative or no
effect on organisational performance. 
The second possibility is that the benefits of disclosure are
greater in situations where the workforce is less committed
to the organisation. In this view, committed employees,
unlike ones who exhibit low levels of OC, can already be
expected to exert a high level of effort on behalf of their
organisation, irrespective of the amount of information they
are provided with by management. Here disclosure is likely
to have less effect on their behaviour and performance than
on that of less committed employees, who may interpret the
increased provision of information as a sign of management
goodwill and cooperation and reciprocate accordingly. 
A final distinction might be made between unionised and
non-unionised workplaces. To the extent that residual
claims games and overt conflicts of interest are more likely
in unionised than in non-unionised establishments, disclo-
sure could be expected to have a generally more limited
impact on performance outcomes in the former. By the
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The dataset used for the analysis is the
WERS98 cross-section. This contains
information on 2,191 British
workplaces with 10 or more
employees and consists of interviews
with management, 918 workplace
representatives and a survey of 28,215
employees. By weighting the data, the
sample can be made representative of
the population of British workplaces
surveyed. Data from both management
and employees were used in the
present analysis. We controlled for
variations between establishments in
terms of size, sector and a range of
other characteristics. 
Probit, ordered probit and ordinary
least squares models were fitted to the
data, depending on the nature of the
dependent variable under
consideration and probability weights
were used throughout. The sample
was divided into union and non-union
workplaces, depending on whether a
union was recognised for the purpose
of negotiating pay and conditions.
Union strength was measured by
whether union representatives
negotiated with management at the
establishment on nine issues (pay or
conditions of employment, recruitment
or selection of employees, training,
payment systems, grievances handling,
staffing or manpower planning, equal
opportunities, health and safety, and
performance appraisals). The sample
mean on this variable was used to
distinguish between strong and weak
union contexts. 
Our two main dependent variables (the
overall level of workplace labour
productivity and product/service
quality) were derived from the
WERS98 Management Questionnaire.
This asked managers to rate their
labour productivity and quality of the
product/service on a 5-point scale,
ranging from “A lot better than
average” to “A lot below average”. 
As these responses are not evenly
distributed between the five
categories, we considered whether the
response was “above average”,
“average”, or “below average”. It was
then possible to fit a probit model to
these two dependent variables.
Our main intervening variable was the
average level of employee
organisational commitment at the
workplace (OC). This was measured
with three items from the Employee
Questionnaire. These asked
respondents to rate, on a five-point
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”
Likert scale, the extent to which they
shared the values of the organisation,
their feeling of loyalty to the
organisation and the extent to which
they felt proud to tell people where they
worked. Responses to the three items
were first combined into an overall OC
scale (coefficient alpha = .83) and then
aggregated across each workplace to
give a measure of average employee
commitment within each establishment.
An ordinary least squares model was
then fitted to this intervening variable. In
separate analyses, this measure of
organisational commitment was also
used as a predictor of labour
productivity and product/service quality.  
The three main variables for disclosure
of information were all derived from the
Management Questionnaire. Managers
were asked whether they regularly
gave employees or their
representatives information about
internal investment plans, the financial
position of the establishment, or
staffing plans. The variable for
disclosure of general information was
based on the responses to these three
questions and indicates the total
number of issues on which
management shared information with
employees. The variable for disclosure
of performance targets measures the
extent to which managers were
prepared to supply operational-type
information to employees or their
representatives. Managers were asked
whether they set targets for
sales/fees/budgets, costs, profits,
labour costs, productivity,
product/service quality, labour turnover,
absenteeism, and training. They were
further asked whether employees or
employee representatives were
informed of these targets. The variable
for disclosure of targets was
constructed from the responses to two
similar questions, which asked
managers whether they kept records
on the same set of nine issues used to
determine strength of union presence
and whether they shared information
on these records with employees. 
The variable for disclosure of
performance results was constructed
from these two questions to indicate
those establishments that kept records
on at least one of these issues and
shared the information that they
collected with employees. 
To test the contingency hypotheses,
three composite multiplicative variables
were constructed from information in
the WERS98 survey. To reduce
multicorrelinearity, all the multiplicative
interaction term variables were mean-
centered. The first set comprised a
series of contextual variables, including
whether the workplace was in the
private or public sector and the
industrial sector in which the
establishment operated. The second
set comprised a number of key
structural and industrial relations
characteristics of the establishment,
including its size and age, the gender
and skill composition of the workforce,
the extent of industrial conflict in the
past year and whether a union was
recognised for purposes of negotiating
pay and conditions. The third set
included a series of management
variables, covering key areas of human
resource policy and practice. These
included whether the establishment
had a strategic HR plan, whether it
had a range of contingent pay,
selection, communications, equal
opportunities and family-friendly
practices in place, and whether there
was an emphasis on multiskilling and
on decentralised job design. Relevant
statistics for the control variables are
available from the authors.
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same token, in unionised settings, the impact is likely to be
weaker where unions are stronger. 
Table 1 provides a summary of the core variables for
“organisational commitment” and “information disclosure”
used in our study to test our main “universalistic” and
“contingency” hypotheses. These are shown for the sample
as a whole and for union and non-union establishments
separately. The extent of disclosure varied considerably,
depending on the particular type of information involved.
Thus management provided information on performance
targets in 82% of establishments, but feedback on the
achievement of targets in only 19%. The breakdown shows
that management was significantly more likely to disclose all
types of information in union than in non-union establish-
ments. In contrast, average levels of employees' organisa-
tional commitment tended to be significantly higher in
non-union than in union workplaces. 
The results of the regression analyses used to test the
hypotheses are shown in Table 2. To save space, only the
results for the sample as a whole are shown and the results
for the control variables are not included in the Table. These
results are available from the authors. 
Equation 1 in Table 2 shows the impact of the three disclo-
sure variables on organisational commitment, while
equations 2 and 3 show the impact of both the disclosure
Table 1. Descriptive data
Percent of establishments where Non-union Union
management disclosed: Total sample Sub-sample Sub-sample
% % %
Full range of general info. 40 33 60 ***
Performance targets info. 82 78 92 ***
Performance results info. 19 14 32 ***
Mean level of employee OC 3.62 3.64 3.57 ***
(N) (937) (444) (493)
Note: *** Difference between non-union and union sub-samples significant at p < .001.
Table2. Tests of hypotheses for total sample: regression results
Equation No. 1 2 3 4 5
Independent variables OC Labour Prod./serv. Labour Prod./serv.
prod. quality prod. quality
Disclosure of -.007 .027 -.094 .046 -.087
general information (.028) (.087) (.089) (.085) (.087)
Disclosure of .277*** .033 .338 -.028 .347
performance targets (.079) (.237) (.240) (.246) (.247)
Disclosure of -.027 -.053 .688*** -.095 .689***
performance results (.066) (.181) (.178) (.183) (.175)
Org. commitment  .613*** .113 .624* .160
(.199) (.203) (.199) (.194)
General info x OC -.172* -.079
(.078) (.084)
Perf. targets x OC .007 .061
(.069) (.064)
Perf. results x OC .145* -.064
(.063) (.068)
(N) (937) (937) (937) (937) (937)
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. *** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05
In theory, organisational commitment has a positive impact
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variables and OC together on labour productivity and
product/service quality respectively. Taken together, these
first three equations serve to test our “universalistic”
hypotheses. Equations 4 and 5 are designed to assess the
two “contingency” hypotheses by testing for possible
moderator effects in the data. This was done by adding the
interactions between the three disclosure variables and OC
as predictors in the analysis to show the impact of the
relevant interaction terms on labour productivity and
product/service quality. 
The results from equations 1, 2, and 3 are mixed, but
provide at least partial support to both our “universalistic”
hypotheses. Equation 1 shows that neither the disclosure of
general information by management nor the provision of
performance feedback had a significant effect on employee
commitment. Equation 3 shows that, in turn, commitment
was not significantly related to product/service quality.
However, equation 1 shows that the disclosure of perform-
ance targets had a positive impact on employee commit-
ment (ß = .277, p < .001) and equation 3 shows that this,
in turn, was positively related to labour productivity 
(ß = .688, p < .01). 
Similarly, equation 2 indicates that none of the information
disclosure variables had a direct effect on labour productiv-
ity. In addition, equation 3 shows that neither the disclosure
of general information nor the sharing of performance
targets by management had a direct impact on
product/service quality. However, management provision of
performance feedback to employees was found in equation
3 to have a significant direct positive effect on
product/service quality (ß  = .689, p < .001). 
The results are also mixed in relation to the “contingency”
hypotheses, but again provide partial support for them.
Only two of the interaction terms in equations 4 and 5
attained significance, both in relation to labour productivity.
The interaction between performance feedback and OC in
equation 4 is positive and significant (ß = .145, p < .05),
suggesting that performance feedback had a stronger
positive effect on labour productivity in establishments
where there were higher levels of employee commitment.
The specific form of this interaction is shown in Figure 1.
In contrast, the interaction between management disclosure
of general information and OC in equation 4 is negative 
(ß = -.172, p < .05). This suggests that general disclosure
had a more positive effect on labour productivity in estab-
lishments where there were lower levels of employee
commitment. The specific form of the interaction is repre-
sented in Figure 2, showing that the relationship between
disclosure and productivity in this case was shifted in a
negative direction. 
On the whole, therefore, management provision of general
information to employees was found to be negatively and
not positively related to productivity. However, this negative
Figure 1. Performance Feedback x OC Interaction
For Labour Productivity
Figure 2. General Information x OC Intercation for
Labour Productivity
In Japan information disclosure was positively related to productivity
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Figure 3. Schematic Summary of Regression Results
Labour productivity Quality
Total sample (a) (b)
Non-union sample (c) (d)
Union sample (e) (f)
Weak union sapmple (g) (h)
Strong Union sample (i) (j)
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disclosure of performance targets by management had an
indirect positive effect on labour productivity through its
impact on employee commitment. However, this indirect
effect was less pronounced in union settings, where the
initial link between disclosure and OC was weaker (see (c)
and (e) in Figure 3). In addition, in union settings the disclo-
sure of performance targets had a negative direct impact on
productivity, thereby cancelling out its positive indirect
effect through commitment. In other words, our results
suggest that in union settings, the disclosure of perform-
ance targets by management did not have a significant
overall effect on labour productivity.
Of all the effects examined, only one was found to be
stronger in union than in non-union establishments. This
was the impact of general information disclosure on labour
productivity. In union workplaces, management disclosure
of general information to the workforce had a direct positive
impact on productivity, while in non-union establishments
the effect was not significant.
For the union sub-sample, we also looked separately at
establishments where the unions were weak and where
they were strong. The detailed results are summarised in
Figure 3 (g) to (j). Here the results are not as clear cut.
Contrary to expectations, the impact of information disclo-
sure on outcomes was not consistently weaker in
effect was less pronounced in establishments charac-
terised by lower levels of employee commitment. 
Figure 3 sets out in schematic form the main results of the
regression analyses. 3(a) and 3(b) are a summary for the
sample as a whole, in relation to productivity and quality
respectively. The lower parts of the Figure give the results
for particular sub-samples. The results for the sample as 
a whole provide selective support for all our main 
starting hypotheses.
When we tested our hypotheses on non-union and union
establishments separately, two main points stood out. First,
the results for the non-union sub-sample are virtually the
same as those for the sample as a whole (compare (a) and
(b) with (c) and (d) in Figure 3). Second, in line with expec-
tations, the results for union establishments are generally
weaker than those for non-union establishments. Thus none
of the relationships found in the non-union sub-sample
emerged as significant in the union sub-sample. Moreover,
while the effects found for non-union establishments were
also found in the union sub-sample, they were significantly
attenuated. Specifically, the positive link between perform-
ance feedback and product/service quality was weaker in
union settings (compare (d) and (f) in Figure 3). 
Similarly, in both union and non-union establishments,
One game involves bargaining over residual rents
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workplaces where unions were stronger. Specifically,
where unions were weak there was the same direct
positive link between performance feedback and
product/service quality that we found in non-union
settings. On the other hand, where unions were strong,
the impact of performance feedback was not significant.
(The same applied in terms of the impact of OC on labour
productivity.) However, where unions were strong, general
information disclosure by management was found to be
positively related to labour productivity and, where they
were weak, this relationship (as in non-union settings) was
not significant. 
Taken as a whole, our findings suggest that the impact of
information disclosure on organisational performance is
considerably more complex than is commonly assumed 
in the literature. They indicate that management’s system-
atic sharing of information on performance targets can
help to enhance employee commitment and that this, in
turn, can have a positive impact on labour productivity. 
But the evidence is that this effect is indirect and that 
its impact is affected by the level of employees’ organisa-
tional commitment. 
The provision of feedback on the achievement of opera-
tional targets can also have a positive impact on labour
productivity. However, our results indicate that, across the
sample as a whole, this effect is only found where levels of
employee organisational commitment are high. In other
words, our analysis suggests that this beneficial effect on
labour productivity will be confined primarily to situations
where there already is a reasonable degree of alignment
between individual and organisational goals.
The results relating to the disclosure of general financial
and manpower information by management present a
different picture. Across the sample as a whole, the disclo-
sure of such general information seems to have little or no
effect on labour productivity, especially where levels of
employee commitment are low. However, where commit-
ment is high, general information disclosure tends to be
negatively, rather than positively, related to productivity. 
One possible explanation for this unexpected result is that,
other things being equal, management is more likely to
disclose “bad news” to employees with high levels of
commitment to the organisation. This would help to
account for the stronger negative relation observed
between disclosure and productivity at higher levels of
commitment. It would also suggest, however, that disclo-
sure may be a function of organisational performance,
rather than the other way around, which raises important
questions about direction of causality. 
It is also worth noting that information disclosure seems to
have a much weaker impact on product/service quality than
on labour productivity. Specifically, our results for the total
sample show that, of the three types of disclosure
examined, only the disclosure of information on operational
performance outcomes has a significant impact on quality.
The impact in this case is positive and direct, thereby
lending support to the idea that information disclosure can
have a beneficial effect on organisational performance
independent of its impact on employee commitment. 
As we noted at the outset, information disclosure by
management tends to be greater in union than in non-union
settings. However, these higher levels of disclosure do not
necessarily translate into higher levels of either employee
commitment or organisational performance. Our results
suggest, in fact, that the general pattern of direct, indirect,
and moderated benefits associated with disclosure applies
primarily to non-union rather than to union establishments.
This contrast is especially marked for establishments where
unions are strong. On balance, therefore, our results
suggest that there are greater direct and indirect benefits to
be reaped from information disclosure in non-union than in
union settings, but that in union establishments the impact
of disclosure is likely to be more neutral than negative. 
Equally important, our results indicate that employees’
organisational commitment plays a far more important role
in non-union than in union settings, either as a mediator or
as a moderator of the impact of disclosure on performance
outcomes. In union settings, disclosure not only has a
weaker positive impact on commitment, but this commit-
The impact is weaker where
unions are stronger
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ment itself has more limited direct and moderator effects on
performance. Taken together, these findings suggest that
information disclosure is likely to produce a greater degree
of alignment between individual and organisational goals in
situations where management has a clearer monopoly of
information and where, because of the lack of a union
presence and voice, alternative sources of information and
competing interpretations of events are less easily available
to employees. 
These findings have implications for policy makers and
legislators, for firms and their information practices, and for
trade unions, particularly in the context of the new
Information Directive. An implication for management is that
there may be an optimal sequence to disclosure. Disclosure
of performance targets enhances organisational commit-
ment and can have a positive impact on productivity, but it
also affects how employees respond to other types of infor-
mation disclosure. 
To maximise the positive impact of disclosure, firms might
wish to start with disclosure of performance targets and
then expand the disclosure agenda to include information
on performance outcomes. However, in union settings, it
may be best for management to focus directly on disclosure
of general information. For unions, the most obvious role is
in terms of general information. Here disclosure can have a
positive impact on organisational performance. However,
the findings also suggest that there is scope for unions to
play a positive role in conveying operational information that
affects employee commitment and labour productivity. 
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H
orseracing mirrors our
society. At one
extreme, rich owners
pay £1 million plus for
a yearling with potential
and receive a stud fee
of up to £100,000 a time when a
successful three- or four-year-old
horse is retired to stud. At the other
end of the scale, the people who care
for these horses – stable lads (the
same description applies to men and
women) – have a collective agreement
where the pay rate ranges from
£10,000 to £12,000 a year for a 
40-hour week.
In the wake of a hard-hitting campaign
by the Racing Post – the industry's
trade paper – the governing body (the
British Horseracing Board) established
a Commission to investigate stable
staff pay, employment and conditions.
So it is worth setting out the
connections between pay and
employment in this industry.
There are some 6,000 stable staff
(roughly 5,000 full-time equivalent) of
whom 4,000 are directly involved in
the care of horses. Some of these
4,000 will be paid above the minimum
rates set out in the collective
agreement between the union, the
Stable Lads Association, and their
employers, the National Trainers
Federation. But the fact remains that
stable lads are the poor relations of
the racing industry.
A boost in the pay of stable staff
could come in a number
of ways: an
increase in
basic rates, more generous overtime
or compensation for weekend
working, appearance money, or
greater emphasis on performance
related pay. But, whichever
mechanisms are chosen, any such
pay rise does not come out of thin air.
Therefore we first examine the factors
that influence the response of trainers
and owners if they are expected to
provide the resources for a pay rise
for stable staff. Next, the important
links between the product market and
labour market, including prize money
and alterations in the types of racing
market, are set out. The factors that
underpin workers’ power are then
analysed. Finally, we are fortunate in
Britain to have had a virtual natural
experiment to test the sensitivity of
jobs to a pay rise – the introduction
and subsequent uprating of the
by David Metcalf
Race 
relations 
The laws of
economics apply
equally to the Sport
of Kings, argues
David Metcalf. 
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national minimum wage. The
evidence is examined and related to
the pay and employment of stable
staff. It suggests that a judicious 
pay hike would be unlikely to lead 
to job losses.
Three factors determine the
sensitivity (in the jargon, “elasticity”)
of employment to a wage rise. First,
employment is less sensitive the
smaller labour costs are in total
costs. (This is one reason why, for
example, airline pilots earn very high
salaries.) Among stable staff, labour
costs comprise quite a high fraction
of total labour costs. If the annual
cost of keeping a horse in training is,
say, £15,000 and a stable lad earns
£17,000 while looking after three
horses, labour costs would comprise
some two fifths total training costs.
So, on this factor, employment will
be quite sensitive to a pay rise.
But we should not forget that, for 
the owner, there is the initial cost of
the horse. Where a horse costs
upwards of £50,000, an extra £1,000
a year or so on training fees may
matter little. (But, for the many less
wealthy owners who pay
below £20,000 for a
horse, an increase of £1,000 a 
year in training costs may be 
quite significant.)
Second, is it easy to substitute
capital or other workers for the
group whose pay rises? It is not
possible to replace riders with a
machine, but it might be possible to
find other stable lads, perhaps from
countries about to be in the EU, like
Poland or the Czech Republic.
Providing any collective agreement
between the National Trainers
Federation and the Stable Lads is
properly enforced, however, trainers
have less incentive to seek such
substitute labour because they would
have to pay the employees from
abroad similar rates. So, on this
criterion, employment is likely to be
quite insensitive to a pay rise.
Third, how sensitive is the demand
for the product to any price increase
resulting from the wage hike? For
example, in the 1970s coal miners
had huge clout because almost all
our power stations were coal-fired
and few coal imports were allowed.
The demand for coal (and 
hence coal miners) was pretty
unresponsive to its cost. The
“product” here is keeping the horse
in training and the following
questions need answers.
Would trainers automatically pass on
to owners any pay increase for
stable staff in the form of higher
training fees? Many trainers already
operate on low margins and would
have no option. Maybe those
Newmarket trainers charging around
£25,000 a year per horse would not
increase their fees, but they are
probably paying their staff above the
nationally agreed rates already.
Next, if training fees rise, how will
owners react? The number of
horses in training in recent years
has been pretty steady at around
13,000. It is simply impossible to
tell in advance whether this number
would fall and by how much – it all
depends on the size of any pay rise
and subsequent hike in training
fees. Of course, those who
constantly argue that there is too
much racing would presumably
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welcome such a cut in the horse
population – a smaller, more highly
paid labour force looking after 
fewer horses.
So theory does not provide an
unambiguous answer. While
employment is insensitive to a pay
rise, because it is difficult to use
lower paid alternative staff, the fact
that labour costs comprise a
relatively high fraction of training fees
means that trainers, and to some
extent owners, have an incentive to
economise on staff.
In recent years there has been a
substantial increase in prize money –
albeit from a very low base – which
may make owners a bit more willing
to put up with higher training fees.
Certainly, if the boost in prize money
continues, it would be easier to
accommodate any pay hike for stable
staff. But, if prize money stagnates or
is eroded, such accommodation
would be more difficult.
This leads to the “performance”
element in stable staff pay. The mix
varies according to the type of race,
but presently prize money is
allocated roughly as follows:
%
owners 80 
trainers 8
jockeys 6 
stable staff 5 
other 1
With prize money of some £80 million,
the annual pool for stable staff when
horses are in the frame is, therefore,
£4 million, which averages out at
some £1,000 per head – but
obviously the lion's share goes to the
successful yards.
Would it be possible, or sensible, to
increase this performance related
pay? Even if the pool were doubled,
on average stable staff would only get
around an extra £1,000 each, with
many getting almost nothing because
their yard has fewer winners or
placed horses. Further, who would
pay for the doubling of the stables’
share from 5% to 10%? It seems
unlikely that the jockeys or trainers
would easily submit to a reduction in
their share. And owners are already
rattling their sabres about the prize
money on offer at particular tracks.
Although they receive
four fifths of the 
total, they would be reluctant to see
that share diminish.
In the light of last year’s boycott of the
Sandown Park meeting by jockeys
over the arcane matter of the use of
mobile phones it is worth asking what
gives workers power. In broad terms,
power flows from two things: first, a
closed shop giving workers some
control over the labour supply; and,
second, a credible threat of strike
action that could impose real costs on
the employer or, via collateral damage,
on third parties.
Stable staff have never even been
properly unionised, so it is no surprise
that they have not had a proper
closed shop. The Stable Lads
Association – set up in 1975 in the
wake of an unsuccessful strike 
by TGWU – is an unusual union
because it is funded (since 2001) via
a (very small) percentage of prize
money and all stable employees are
automatically members, though many
stable staff seem unaware of this. 
The SLA has difficulty in organising
effectively in the context of employer
hostility, small, scattered workplaces
and staff who care very much for 
the welfare of the horses. 
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The strike threat normally requires
solidarity, either across the whole sector
or more selectively. Frankly, there seems
little chance of solidarity across all yards.
However, if stable staff threatened to
refuse to transport and look after horses
scheduled to run at Cheltenham or
Royal Ascot, for example, such a threat
would need to be taken very seriously.
Racing’s “product” is perishable – 
like a newspaper or a tube journey – 
and any such selective action would 
have a profound impact on the whole
industry. So it is much better to 
get the vexed issue of staff pay and
conditions properly dealt with before it
comes to this.
The racing industry was ahead of its
time in the 1990s when there was no
minimum wage protection for British
employees. The collective agreement
between the NTF and the SLA provided
a de facto minimum wage for racing
staff. The key to this was the
enforcement mechanism: any trainer
found paying below collectively agreed
rates was at risk of losing his or her
licence to train.
Since 1999 we have had a National
Minimum Wage (NMW) – £4.85 an hour
from October this year. The introduction
of the NMW and the subsequent
upratings (covering some 1.5 million
workers) provide a natural experiment
to help answer the question whether a
substantial increase in wages
automatically leads to job losses. The
theory discussed earlier did not yield
an unambiguous answer in the case of
horse racing. Fortunately, the evidence
for the UK labour market is clearer.
Mark Stewart and Steve Machin at
Warwick University and the CEP
respectively are agreed that, taking the
labour market as a whole, the NMW
has not caused job losses.
Even in the special case of care
homes, which – like racing – are
labour intensive and which have
difficulty in passing on any increase in
wage costs (because the Department
of Social Security caps the payments
that they receive), a 10% increase 
in pay only cut employment by
between 2 and 4%. If a similar
response held for racing, it would
imply that a wage rise of, for example,
£30 - £40 a week would only cause
some 150 job losses.
In the overall labour market the NMW
may even have given a boost to
employment by making it easier to fill
job vacancies (in the jargon, the bottom
end of the labour market may be
monopsonistic). There is an important
parallel with racing here. Tied housing,
workers’ love of particular horses in the
yard and geographically isolated yards
all combine together to give trainers
some hold over workers. In such
circumstances, a judicious pay rise will
not automatically result in job losses.
Surely the time has come for racing to
recognise the dedicated, caring,
knowledgeable workers who contribute
so much to owners’ pleasure and
whose efforts provide bookmakers with
their licence to print money.
David Metcalf is Professor of Industrial
Relations at the LSE and a member of the
CEP. He is an independent member of the
Low Pay Commission. He is a local Jockey
Club Steward at Plumpton and Folkestone
and a member of the Economic Security
partnership, which has two national hunt
horses in training with Paul Webber.
This article is based on evidence 
submitted to the investigation by 
the Stable and Stud Staff Commission. 
The full evidence is available from
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/people/cv/david_
metcalf.pdf 
(click on [Stable and 
Stud Staff Commission]).
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